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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EARL W. WILSO·N, doing business as 
Wilson's Used Cars and HARTFORD 
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDU)STRIAL ~cOMMIS·SlO·N O·F 
UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, wioow, 
and BEVERLY BARNEY, minor, 
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased, 
Defiendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
ST~TEMENT O·F 'T'HE CASE 
Case No. 
719'1 
This case comes before this. Honorable Court on a 
Writ of Review to the Industrial ;Comrirission of Utah, 
to review an Order of the commission, awarding to de-
fendants Roberta and Beverly Barney death benefits 
in the sum of $7000.00, for th·e death of Frank Barney, 
deceased. 'The single question before the Court is whether 
decedent's fatal injuries were sustained in an accident 
arising out of, or in the course of his employment. 
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In this brief, plaintiff, Earl W. Wilson, will be re-
ferred to as Wilson; plaintiff Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co., will be referred to as Hartford Co., and the 
defendant Industrial ·Commission of Utah will be re-
ferred to as the Commission. 
At all times material to this controversy, Earl W. 
Wilson was engaged in the used car selling and auto-
mobile repair business. (Tr. p. 7). He had two places 
of business in Salt Lake ·City, Utah, and also had places 
of business in Ogden and Magna, Utah, and Phoenix 
Arizona ('T. p. 8). 
For a period of about two years preceding January 
9, 1947, decedent Barney had been employed intermit-
tently by Wilson (Tr. p·. 7). Wilson's place of business in 
Magna had been ''taken over" hy him a short time prior 
to January 4, 1947, '(Tr. p. 2!6), and on the date last men-
tioned Wilson had ·engaged the services of Barney, who 
was to ''take over'' the Magna ''setup and get that go-
ing." ('Tr. p. 13). 
Barney was to receive $40.00 ( Tr. p. 8) or $45.00 
(Tr. p. 14) per week, p~lus commissions on the sale of 
cars. (Tr. p·p·. 8, 14). He was employed in the capacity 
of mechanic and foreman. '('Tr. P'· 7) He didn't have any 
regular hours, but ordinarily went to work about eight 
o'clock. ( Tr. pp. 10, '11, 25, 28, 35) His hours varied 
somewhat, depending upon the amount of business. (Tr. 
pp. 13, 27) 
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Barney sustained fatal injuries in an auton1obile 
accident at about 8:15 a.m., on January 9, 1947, while 
riding as a passenger in an automobile being driven by 
Foote, a mechanic, who 'Yas also en1ployed by Wilson 
and "~ho worked at the Magna shop. (Tr. pp. 5, 30, 32) 
At the time of the accident Foote and Barney were 
traveling from their respective homes in Salt Lake City 
to \\Tilson's place of business in Magna. They had left 
their homes about 8 :00 a.m., and the accident occurred 
at about 7200 West 21st South 'Street. (Tr. p. 30) 'The 
accident occurred on a Thursday, and Barney and Foote 
had been working for Wilson only since the previous 
Monday. (Tr. p. 31) 
During the first three days of his employment, i.e., 
during the three days immediately prior to his death, 
Barney had worked at Magna every day. His chief func-
tion there was to get the shop started and operating, but 
if he had time he assisted with the repair work. (Tr. 
p. 15) Although up to the time of his death he had 
worked only at Magna, Barney's work was connected 
with Wilson's places of business in Salt Lake, Ogden, 
and Phoenix as well. (Tr. pp .. 9, 10, 23, 26, 27, 29) It 
appears that on the ·evening of January 8, plaintiff had 
completed the job of organizing and setting up the Magna 
shop, (Tr. p. 29), and that thereafter his work might 
take him to any of Wilson's places of business. Wilson 
testified that if Barney had not been killed on the morn-
ing of January 9, that he would have worked in ,s:alt 
Lake on that afternoon, and would have worked at the 
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Ogden place of business on the following day (January 
lOth) (Tr. pp. 27, 2'9). He was as much foreman of the 
Salt Lake shop, as of the Magna shop. (Tr. p. 27) 
On January 8, the day before the fatal accident, Wil-
son had removed an automobile from Ogden to Magna for 
repairs. CTr. p. 15) On the evening of January 8, when 
Barney called at the home of Wilson, Wilson instructed 
him to go out to Magna the next morning; hut whether 
he instructed Barney to go out there and bring into Salt 
Lake the automobile· which Wilson.had taken there from 
Ogden on the preceding day, or whether he merely in-
structed him to go out there and complete the repairs to 
be done on the automobile is uncertain. Wilson testified 
that he ordered Barney to go out to Magna and bring the 
truck in to Salt Lake. ( Tr. p. 9) However, he admitted 
that he didn't know the status of the repairs on the car 
on that morning, and he didn't know whether it was 
ready to come to Salt Lake ( Tr. p. 15), and further, 
that if the repair work on the automobile were not com-
pleted, Barney, or Foote under Barney's direction, would 
have to complete the repairs before the car could be 
brought into Salt Lake (~r. p. 16), and further admitted 
that he had told Charles Welch, a Salt L·ake attorney 
who investigated the accident, that he had sent Barney 
out to Magna to make repairs, and that he, Wilson, 
signed a written statement to that effect. (Tr. p. 17). 
However, two days. before the hearing of this matter be-
fore the commission, and app·roxima.tely a year after the 
occurrence, of the fatal accident, Wils-on called at the of-
fice of one of counsel for the plaintiffs and asked to 
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change his "~ritten statement to the effect that he sent 
Barney out to niagna on the n1orning of January ~), not 
for the purpose of making repairs, but for the purpose 
of bringing the automobile to Salt Lake. (Tr. pp. 18-19) 
Both Foote and Barney had al,Yays furnished their 
own transportation to Magna. They receive~ no allow-
ance for travel, and th€y selected their own means and 
route of transportation. Wilson had never furnished 
transportation for either. (Tr .. pp. 14, 20, 27, 28, 3'3, 34) 
Wilson left it to the initiative and judgment of Barney, 
as to how he would get the car from Magna to Salt Lake. 
(Tr. p. 24:) The car was to be in Salt Lake by noon. 
(Tr. p. 25) 
It is adm.itt€d that Wilson was an employer coming 
within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and that the Hartford Company was his insurance 
carrier, and it is undisputed that Roberta and Beverly 
Barney were respectively the surviving widow and minor 
daughter of Frank Barney, and that they were his de-
pendents. 
The facts above stated are substantially without dis-
pute, except as to the question of whether on the eve-
ning of January 8, when Wilson ordered Barney to go out 
to Magna on the following morning, he instructed B·ar-
ney to complete the repairs on the automobile, or whether 
he merely instructed ~ to bring the automobile into 
Salt Lake. As will be more fully pointed out in our 
argument, hereafter, we do not regard this as of sub-
stantial importance. However, if the court should he of 
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the opinion that this point of fact is crucial, we think 
that the instructions given by Wilson to Barney must 
be understood as tacitly and implicitly, if not expressly 
and explicitly, directing Barney to complete repairs upon 
the automobile before bringing it to Salt Lake. The fact 
that Wilson did not know what the state of repairs on 
the automobile was, the fact that Barney was to go to 
~ [agna in the morning, but not deliver the car in 'Salt 
Lake until noon, and the fact that Wilson's wrecker was 
broken down at the time and not available for use, and 
hence that the car would have to be brought to Salt 
Lake on its own power, all lead irresistably to the con-
clusion that it was implicit, if not explicit in Wilson's 
instructions to Barney, that Barney should see that re-
pairs were completed upon the automobile ~before he 
brought it to Salt Lake. 
ASSIG·N·MENTS ·OF ERRO'R 
Plaintiffs assign as ·error the following rulings and 
orders of the commission: 
1. 'The commission erred in finding that ''the de-
ceased did sustain an injury arising out of or in the 
course of his employment on the 9th day of January, 
1947." 
2. ·The commission erred in finding that ''the ap-
p;licants are entitled to the benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Act.'' 
3. The commission erred in ordering the plaintiffs 
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to pay for all hospital and n1edical expense iucurrPd in 
connection "ith this injury. 
4. The commission erred in ordering plaintiffs to 
pay the statutory burial allowance of $250.00. 
5. The Commission erred in making an award to 
the applicants of $7000.00, or any award whatsoever. 
ARGUMEN·T 
As stated at the outset of this brief, the only ques-
tion before this Honorable Court is· whether _the auto-
mobile accident which claimed the life of Frank Barney 
was an accident arising out of or in the course ~f his 
employment with Earl Wilson. 
It is the general rule, now well established, both in 
this jurisdiction, and in the United States generally, and 
subject to few exceptions, that an injury sustained by 
an employee while going to or returning from work, with-
out restraint, does not arise out of or in the course of 
his employment. This doctrine is now so well established 
that a citation of authorities hardly seems necessary, but 
we refer the Court to the following for illustrative pur-
poses: Greer v. Ind. Com., 74 Ut. 379, 279 Pac. 900; 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189, 8 Pac. 
(2d) 617; \Titagrap,h, Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 96 Ut. 190, 85 
Pac. ( 2d) 601; London Guarantee & Ace. Co. v. Ind. Ace. 
Comm., 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977; Ind. Comm. v. Ander-
son (Colo.), 169 Pac. 13'5, L.R.A. 1918 F. 885; Hartford 
Accident & Ins. Co. v. Lodes, (Okla.), 22 Pac. ( 2d) p. 
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361; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.v. Stout, (Okla.), 65 Pac. 
( 2d) 4 77; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Ind. Acdt. 
Cotnm., ('Cal.), 37 Pac. (2d) 441, annotation in 97 A.L.R. 
555, 556; and 1. Honnold on Workmen's Compensation 
358, Sec. 107. 
!The fundamental purpose of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts is to make the cost of the human wreck-
age in industry a part of the cost of production, to be 
borne by society as a whole, and not by the unfortunate 
workmen. However, it was not the purpose of the acts, 
and it was n~ver intended by the legislature, that work-
men should be specially protected against hazards com-
mon to all, and having no relation to their employment. 
This principle is well stated in 28 R.'C.L.. 804, Work-
men's Compensation Acts, Sec. 98, where it is ·said: 
"The compensation act, it has been very gen-
erally held, does not authorize an award in case 
of injury or death from a peril which is common 
to all mankind, or to which the public at large is 
exposed. The argument seems to be that if the 
worlrman were permitted to recover in such cases, 
he would enjoy privileges above those of the pub-
lic generally, and in effect he insured against 
every sort of calamity, which is not the intention 
of the statute. At home or on the street he may 
meet with accident (sic) not arising out of or in 
the course of his employment. 'The act does not 
cover such cases. The employee gets up in the 
morning, dresses hims·elf, and goes to work, be-
cause of his employment, yet if he meets with 
an accident before coming to the employer's 
premises or his place of work, that is not a risk 
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of his occupation, but of life genernlly." 
In the earlv davs of the co1npensation acts the doc-
.. . 
trine of street accidents was developed by the courts, 
and it ,vas held that a workman was not entitled to conl-
pensation for an injury occurring in a public street, 
whether by vehicular collision, by slipping or stumbling 
or otherwise. This doctrine was harsh, and it oftimes 
led to denials of awards for injuries sustained by em-
ployees when they were actually required to incur the 
risks of the streets in the course of their employment. 
See cases annotated in L.R.A. 1916A, 314. Later on, an 
exception to the rule was developed "in the case of work-
men whose employment required them to be frequently 
or continually on the streets such as messengers and 
draymen. 28 R.C.L. 805. 
The modern view, now quite generally aooepted, is 
that employees injured on the streets while in prurswance 
of their duties l()r of theiJr master's business, are entitled 
to compensation. However, the Courts have never de-
parted from the view that employees injured while travel-
ing to or from their work are not entitled to compensa-
tion. The risks of the streets are in that situation risks 
common to all mankind, and workmen are not a class en-
titled to or intended to be specially protected against 
those risks which are common to all. There are some ex-
ceptions to this rule, which we shall note with more 
particularity hereafter, but at present it is sufficient to 
note the general rule. 
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We think that the fundamental principle which must 
guide this court in deciding this case is that the purpose 
of the compensation act is to protect the workman from 
those risks which are incident to his employment, hut 
not to protect him from risks to which the public at 
large is subject, or those risks voluntarily incurred by 
the work1nan and having no relation to his employment. 
'\rhether a risk is a special hazard incident to the Work-
man's employment, or a general risk to which the public 
at large is exposed, must depend upon the facts of each 
case. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. For ex-
ample, the risks of the street are hazards to which all are 
exposed. However, they may also be special hazards in-
cident to the employment of the worker. ·This would be 
especially true of cab and truck drivers, street car con-
ductors, messengers, etc. But the hazards of the street 
likewise are incident to the employment of the steno-
grapher during the time she is carrying the daily mail 
to or from the post-office. However, in the a:hsence of 
special circumstances such risks are not incident to her 
employment during the time she is traveling to the of-
fice in the morning, or from the office to her home at 
the conclusion of her day's work. 
Another reason for the general rule that worlanen 
are not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained 
by them while traveling to or from their place of em-
ployment is that during the time they are upon their 
employer's premises or otherwise engaged in his ser-
vice, they are subject to his control, hut when they are 
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a'vay and not in perforn1ance of their duties, tht~y are 
not subject to his control. An en1ployer can substan-
tially and effectually protect hnnself froin compensa-
tion claims for injuries to his employees on his pre1uises, 
by an effectual safety program. Thus by availing him-
self of mechanical safety appliances, by establishing and 
enforcing rigid rules of safety, by prescribing rules for 
the operation of dangerous machinery, by conscientious 
discovery and elimination of hazards, and by safety 
educational programs among his employees, he may 
substantially reduce, or even wholly eliminate ac-
cidents within his place of business. But during the time 
his employees are traveling to or from his place of busi-
ness he has no control over them whatsoever. If they 
choose to travel over a hazardous route, or by a highly 
dangerous means, that is a matter over which he has 
no control. And it is a matter from which he receives no 
benefit. Consequently, there is no reason in law or good 
morals why he should bear that financial risk. 
Having made these preliminary observations, we 
shall now proceed to an analysis of the facts of this 
case in light of the a:bove mentioned rules and principles. 
Since it is the general rule that an employee is not 
entitled to compensation for injuries sustained by him 
while traveling to or from his employer's place of busi-
ness, the award of the Commission in this case cannot 
be permitted to stand unless the facts of this case bring 
it within one of the established exceptions to the gen-
eral rule; or unless the deceased Barney, for some reason 
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peculiar to the facts of this case may be said to have 
co1rnnenced the course of his employment at the time he 
left his home rather than at the time he arrived at his 
en1ployer's place of business. We shall attempt to demon-
strate, during the balance of this argument, that neither 
of these conditions prevailed. The two propositions are 
to a large extent inextricably interwoven, but we think 
that clear analysis requires that they be considered 
separately, and hence we shall argue them as separate 
points. 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT BRING IT WITHIN 
ANY OF THE RECOGNIZED EX·CEPTIONS TO THE 
GENERAL RULE THAT EMPLOYEES ARE NOT EN-
TITLED TO COMPENSATION F'OR INJURIES SUS-
TAINED BY THEM WHILE TRAVELING TO OR FROM 
THEIR EMPLOYER'S PLACE OF BUSINESS. 
One of the most comprehensive discussions of the 
general rule, sometimes referred to as the plant rule, is 
found in the opinion of this Court in the case of Vita-
graph, Inc. v. Ind. Corum., 96 Ut. 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601. 
After stating and discussing the general rule, the Court 
proceeded to enumerate the exceptions to the rule. 
(1) 'The first stated exception is an apparent and 
not a true exception, but is really an extension of the 
plant rule. This extension of the rule may be stated as 
follows: JThe confines of the plant, or situs of employ-
ment extend beyond the employer's premises and in-
clude the approaches to the work, which the employees 
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are required to use to come upon the e1nployer 's prentises, 
"Then the facts indicate that the danger incident to sueh 
use must have been in contemplation of the employer 
and employee at the tin1e of employment as a danger 
incident to the employment and a necessary part of the 
plant establishment. This doctrine was first enunciated 
in this jurisdiction in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
60 Ut. 161, 207 Pac. 148, 28 A.L.R. 1394, and "'"as fol-
lowed and somewhat broadened in Bountiful Brick Co. 
v. Ind. Comm., 68 Ut. 600, 251 Pac. 555. In both of those 
cases there were railroad tracks immediately adjacent 
to the employer's premises, and in order to come upon 
the ·employer's premises, it was necessary that the em-
ployees cross the tracks, there being no other approach. 
There is nothing in the facts in the case at bar to 
bring it within the doctrine of the :Cudahy and Bountiful 
Brick cases. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the situs of the fatal accident was the necessary 
and exclusive approach_ to Wilson's place of business in 
Magna, nor are there any facts to indicate that the dan-
ger incident to passing over this portion of the road must 
have been in the contemplation of the employer and em-
ployee at the time of employment as a danger incident 
to the employment, and a necessary part of the plant 
establishment. As a matter of fact the locus of the ac-
cident is not fixed in relation to Wilson's place of busi-
ness in Magna. The record does not indicate whether 
they were near together or several miles apart. 
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(2) The second exception to the plant or general 
rule is the special mission or special errand doctrine-, il-
lustrated by the case of Kahn Bros. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 75 
Ut. 145, 28'3 Pac. 1054. ·This was explained in the Vita-
graph case in the following language: 
''This exception coveTs cases where the em-
ployee has detached himself from the plant or 
place of employment and is injured through ex-
posure to the hazards general to the public, when 
such exposure is brought about while in the per-
formance of some task or duty assigned him by 
the employer, and which took him to the place of 
injury. The principle underlying such cases is 
that being at the place of injury under the orders 
of the employer and upon his business, the situs 
or locus of the employment is at the point where 
the employee is at any particular moment while 
carrying out the mission and performing the or-
ders of the employer. 'The employee is exposed 
to the danger because the employer and his busi-
ness put him there. It was not the Workman's 
own whim or business that brought him into the 
place of danger, but the order or business of the 
employer and presupposes that the workman but 
for the fact that he was at the time of injury 
actually doing work for the employer would not 
have been at the place of injury. This is dis-
tinguished from the situation in which the work-
man is injured while going to and from the plant 
or place of employment becaus·e such person is 
not at the time of injury engaged in doing any-
thing for the employer.'' 
In the case at bar, the record is barren of any evi-
dence that Barney was pursuing any special mission or 
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even any incidental mission of his employer. So far as 
the record reveals he was doing nothing Inore than ri<l-
ing out to the Magna shop for the purpose of comn1enc-
ing his day's work. 
(3) The third exception to the plant rule enumer-
ated in the , ... itagraph case is based on the case of Morgan 
v. Ind. Comm., 92 Ut. 129, 66 Pac (2d) 144. 'Ve are in-
clined to agree with the position taken by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe in his concurring opinion in the later case of 
GDodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ind. c·omm., 100 Ut. 8, 
110 Pac. (2d) 334, to the effect that the Morgan case 
was incorrectly decided, and ought to be overruled. How-
ever, that is a matter with which we are not here directly 
concerned. The Morgan case stands upon its own peculiar 
facts and if it is still good law it does- not control here 
because the facts are not similar. 
In that ease the applicant was the principal of Davis 
High School, and was injured while walking from his 
home to the school on a Sunday evening to carry out a· 
special or additional duty at times imposed upon him 
by the conditions of his employment in regard to the 
performance of which he stood in the situation of a 
superior giving orders to himself. In his regular teach-
ing assignments the· applicant would have been operat-
ing under the plant rule, attaching himself to his work 
upon arriving ·at the schoolhouse and detaching himself 
upon leaving it. The basis of that decision was that the 
employee was for all practical purpos·es his own superior, 
directed his own movements and hours and places of 
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work, and by his own direction placed himself upon the 
errand and thus in the place of danger. Not so in the 
case at bar. Although Barney was a foreman, and as-
sumedly had some supervisory duties, there is nothing 
in the record to show that he was his own superior or 
that he had any voice in determining where· he should go. 
Clearly he did not send himself to Magna. He was di-
rected to go there by Wilson. 
(4) The fourth exception noted in the Vitagraph 
case is the situation where the ·employee is <!oing some-
thing incident to his employment while at his home. 
Thus in Beaver City v. Ind. Comm., 67 Ut. 8, 245 Pac. 
378, the city marshall of Beaver was injured while at 
home · cleaning his gun, undisputedly an incident to his 
employment. This is not a true exception to the plant 
rule, for in this situation the employee is not traveling 
to or from his place of employment at all. And it is 
readily apparent that this ·exception has no relation to 
the facts of the case at bar. 
('5) Another exception to the plant rule, not men-
tioned in the Vitagraph case, but generally accepted by 
the courts, and followed by this Court in the present 
case of London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Frazee, 
-- Ut.--, 185 Pac. (2d) 284, is where transportation 
is furnished by the employer to the employee, andjor 
the em:ployee is paid for time spent in traveling to and 
from work. In the case at bar it is undisputed that the 
employer never furnished transportation to Barney, and 
left it entirely up to him as to how he should get from 
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his home to work. Nor is there any ·evidence to show th~t 
plaintiff was to be compensated for time sp'ent in travel. 
He received a weekly wage plus commissions, regardless 
of how much or little time he required to travel to and 
from his work. 
It is quite clear here, that the facts of this case do 
not bring it within any of the recognized exceptions 
to the plant or general rule .. 
POINT II. 
THE DECEASED FRANK BARN.EY CAN N10T BE SAID 
TO HAVE EN'TERED UPON 'THE ·OOURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT AT THE TIME HE LEFT HIS HOME TO 
GO TO MAGNA, OR AT ANY TIME BE~ORE HE AR-
RIVED AT THE MAGNA S.H10P. 
In attempting to argue this point we are at some-
what of a disadvantage, since we cannot anticip·ate what 
contention defendants may make in this regard. We 
have already pointed out that this point is rather closely 
allied to the first point dis-cuss-ed. Much of what has 
been heretofore stated in this brief would be equally 
applicable to the point now under discussion, hut no 
useful purpose could be subserved by rep·eating that 
here. 
We have been unable to discover a case ''on all 
fours'' with the case at bar, either from. this or from 
any foreign jurisdiction. However, the case of McRae 
v. D·epartment of Labor and Industries of Washington, 
(Wash.), 185 Wash. 343, 54 Pac. (2'd) 1017 is very simi-
lar. 'The facts in that case were that the applicant, a 19 
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year old youth who was going to school, was employed 
during after-school hours at a garage, of which his fa-
ther was general manager. The applicant owned a motor-
cycle, which he rode from home to sehool and from 
Bchool to work. He also used the motorcycle to run er-
rands for the garage. He did not have any definite hours, 
and the number of hours he worked per day depended 
upon the amount of business at the garage. He was paid 
a fixed daily wage. One afternoon he did not report for 
work, having slightly injured himself a few days pre-
viously. His father, when he returned home that evening, 
found the youth's condition much improved, and ordered 
him to deliver a truck, which was then at the house, to 
the garage, and instructed him to return home on his 
motorcycle. The youth delivered the truck to the garage 
as directed, and on the return trip home, sustained an 
injury for which he claimed compensation. IThe Supreme 
Court of Washington held that the plant rule was ap-
plicable, that applicant was merely returning home from 
his work when the accident happened, and therefore, the 
injury was not sustained in the course of his employ-
ment. 
It will be noted that in the Washington case, as in 
the case at bar, that the employee did not work regular 
or fixed hours, and that in each case, he had a fixed wage 
regardless of how many or few hours he worked. In the 
Washington case, he was injured while returning home, 
after having made delivery of a vehicle. In the case at 
bar, he was injured while traveling to his employer's 
place of business to pick up a vehicle to be delivered to 
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another shop. The facts are substantially identical and 
the same principles must control. 
In searching the Utah reports we have failed to 
discover a case closely similar on its facts. However, the 
underlying principle has been many times reeogniz-ed 
and followed by this C·ourt. Perhap~s the ca8e mos't similar 
in fact. to the case at bar is Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. 
Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617. 
In that case one Shufelt was employed by the W al-
green Co. which was in the kodak business. The employee 
lived at 1258 Sherman Ave., in Salt Lake City. It was 
his duty to report at his- employer's pilace of business 
every morning at 8:00 a.m. However, before so report-
ing, it was his duty to call at the Semloh Hotel and the 
Union Pacific Depot and pick up films, and bring them 
to his employer's p·lant. Shufelt was killed one ·morn-
ing while he was riding his bicycle to work, when he 
collided with a street car at the intersection of Eleventh 
E·ast Street and She·rman Ave. He had not y·et come to 
the Semloh Hotel where he was to make his first pick-up 
of films. The Industrial Commission made an award of 
death benefits, which award was set aside by this court. 
It was held that the general rule ap·plied. The court 
said: 
"'The award must be, and it accordingly is, 
annulled because the evidence does J_l.Ot support 
the finding that Edwin's (Shufelt's} death was 
caused by an accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment.'' 
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In Roberts v. Ind. Comm., 87 Ut. 10, 47 Pac. (2d) 
1052, Roberts an employee of defendant railroad, whore-
sided at Helper, Utah was called to relieve another em-
ployee who was working overtime. Roberts was instructed 
to report at ~S:oldier Summit, Utah, as soon as possible. 
While enroute from Helper to Soldier Summit, he met 
with an automobile accident which proved fatal. The 
Industrial Commission denied compensation on the 
ground that the deceased was not killed as a result of in-
juries arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment. The order was affirmed hy the Supreme Court, 
which held that deceas,ed was not, at the time of his in-
jury, upon a special service or errand for his employer. 
See also Greer v. Ind. Comm., 74 Ut. 379, 279 Pac. 
900. 
The attention of the court is also invited to Vita-
graph Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 96 U t. 190, 85 Pac. ( 2d) 601, 
which though somewhat different on the facts, contains 
an excellent discussion of the whole question here in-
volved. 
In view of the fact that the applicants have taken 
great p-ains to attempt to prove that Wilson gave Barney 
instructions to bring the car from Magna to Salt. Lake 
and did not give him any instructions to make repairs, 
we anticipiate that defendants may make some conten-
tion in regard to this. We noted, in our statement of 
facts that we regarded this conflict in the evidence as 
immaterial. Whether Barney was instructed to go out 
to Magna to effect repairs on a car, or whether he was 
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to get a car there and deliver it to Salt Lake, it seems 
obvious that his service to his employer could not com-
mence, and he could not begin to perform either duty 
until he got to the place where the car was. We do not 
see any real distinction in the two situations. However, as 
we mentioned in our Statement of Facts, if the Court is 
of the opinion that it makes a substantial difference as 
to what instructions Barney received from Wilson, we 
think that the only reasonabJe inference from the evi-
dence is that it was implicit if not ·explicit in those in-
structions that Barney should eomplete any necessary 
repairs before bringing the automobile to ~Salt Lake. 
CONCLUiSI,O·N 
The fundamental principles upon which the whole 
basis of Worlanen's compensation legislation rests, and 
the previously established rules laid down in the ad-
judicated cases in this jurisdiction require that the order 
of. the commission be set aside. To permit this award to 
stand would he to open wide the gates to a flood of claims 
never intended by the legislature to come within the pro-
visions of the Act, and would throw upon the employer 
the unconscionable burden of the financial responsibility 
for activities of his employees, wholly beyond his con-
trol, and his ability to guard against. It would require 
an abandonment of the rules and princip~les now so well 
established. It is respectfully submitted that the order of 
the Commission must be set aside. 
ART·HUR E. MORET·O·N, 
Attorneys for Pbamtiff 
ELlA'S L. DAY, 
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